interesting when it discusses those cases in which validity of the patent right determines the lawfulness of the settlement under the antitrust laws, 5 and this Essay focuses on such cases.
Part I begins by discussing recent patent law reforms that might help decrease the number of invalid patents the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) issues and also reduce the costs associated with those invalid patents that do issue. These changes include earlier publication of patent applications and improved ability of third parties to initiate a patent reexamination procedure. Such reforms, by decreasing the probability that the holder of an invalid patent may use it to extract anti-competitive settlement terms, may lessen the need for antitrust scrutiny of patent settlement agreements.
Part II begins by noting the incentive distortions that patent settlements can create in infringement disputes, and suggests measures to counteract such incentive distortions and to strengthen private incentives to challenge invalid patents. Specifically, this Part suggests requiring disclosure to the antitrust agencies of settlements that appear to create the greatest antitrust risk, and reinvigorating the longstanding rule against licensee estoppel. We also briefly discuss the merits of awarding bounties for successful challenges to patent validity and awarding attorneys' fees to successful challengers.
Part III focuses on the analysis of settlements when validity of the patent rights is uncertain. Concentrating particularly on the problem of exit payments, this Part discusses different ways in which agencies not known for their patent law expertise can determine the probability of patent invalidity and the existence of an antitrust violation. The alternatives include direct assessment of patent validity in the antitrust proceeding, possible use of objective indicators to determine patent validity, and a legal rule that would modify the incentives of the 5 See id. at 17-19, 21-46.
economic actors to motivate them to act in the public interest in settling patent infringement cases. Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley would combine the use of an objective indicator --the exit payment --with direct assessment of validity. We agree on the exit payment indicator, but would opt for a legal rule that avoids the necessity of proving patent validity.
I. Patent Reforms to Reduce Invalid Patents
Antitrust issues normally arise in patent infringement settlements when patents are invalid or not infringed. Antitrust problems could be greatly reduced by eliminating invalid patents from the patent system. Thus, a threshold question is whether patent reforms could eliminate or reduce the large number of erroneously issued patents, and thereby drastically reduce the need for antitrust scrutiny.
The PTO inevitably issues patents on inventions that do not meet the statutory requirements for protection. 6 This is not surprising. A system that never erred would be costprohibitive. 7 Thus, the issue is not whether policy makers can construct a perfect system, but instead whether they can make cost-effective improvements to the one that already exists.
Invalid patents impose costs on the public in the form of higher prices and restricted output without the public's receiving the benefit of the patent bargain -a new, useful, and non-obvious invention. Recent enactments that require early publication of the patent application and expand reexamination procedures should help to expose more invalid patents. Congress and the PTO should also consider whether other cost-effective reforms exist that would enhance the 6 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 7 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that because most patents are neither litigated nor licensed, it is cheaper to determine validity in those cases that do arise than invest in making the PTO's examination process more accurate).
probability that invalid patents will not cause anti-competitive harms. Several steps have been taken in this direction, and others are possible as we suggest below.
Publication of Patent Applications
In the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Congress amended the Patent Act to provide for publication (with certain exceptions) of a patent application eighteen months after its filing. 8 The PTO just recently implemented the appropriate publication procedures, so it is too early to tell how many inventors will stay in the patent system, particularly when they have weak patent claims. Under the previous rule, patent applicants could maintain their inventions as trade secrets 9 throughout the application process (likely two to three years). If an applicant never received a patent, it could still retain trade secrecy protection for the invention. If the PTO issued a patent, the publication that occurred on issuance would void trade secrecy protection but the inventor would then hold the patent along with its presumption of validity.
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Publication eighteen months after filing the patent application, as the Act now requires, will void trade secrecy protection before the applicant has obtained a patent. 11 Thus, the new publication rule should force applicants to more realistically assess their patentability prospects.
Possibly then, the PTO may issue fewer invalid patents because the applicants themselves will remove weak applications from the system rather than risk losing trade secrecy protection.
Earlier publication also provides third parties with an opportunity to challenge an application before patent issuance. PTO would otherwise be unaware to its attention. This should help the PTO to make more informed and more accurate decisions on patentability.
Unfortunately, these benefits may not be realized if non-trivial numbers of patent applicants take advantage of statutory exceptions that permit "opting out" of the publication requirement. Under the Patent Act as amended, an application will not be published "[i]f an applicant makes a request upon filing, certifying that the invention disclosed in the application has not and will not be the subject of an application filed in another country, or under a multilateral international agreement."
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In a recent speech before the American Intellectual Property Association, Assistant
Attorney General R. Hewitt Pate noted that even those who disagree on whether there is a "'crisis' of too many patents too easily granted" can agree on certain desirable improvements to the system. 13 Among these would be a mandate to publish all applications within eighteen months after filing. 14 Certainly, the salutary effect publication would have on the rate of issuance of invalid patents is more likely to be realized if all applications rather than only selected ones, are published.
Reexamination of Patent Validity
The patent reexamination procedure offers another, albeit post-issuance, method that helps to clear invalid patents from the system. 15 It permits anyone to petition the PTO to review 12 35 U.S.C. §122(b)(2) (also providing that applications no longer pending, those subject to a secrecy order, certain provisional applications, and design patent applications will not be published 24 Unfortunately, the agencies may lack the resources and expertise to mount any meaningful number of challenges.
In summary, the recent innovations regarding publication and reexamination should result in a decline in the number of invalid patents. In addition, the PTO and Congress ought to consider whether additional cost-effective measures exist that might further decrease the probability that the PTO will issue invalid patents. For example, the PTO should continue to scrutinize examiner compensation schemes with an eye toward improving them in ways likely to lead to better PTO performance. 25 Nevertheless, as noted at the outset, the PTO will inevitably issue some invalid patents, and it will do so even if it and Congress take all possible costeffective measures to decrease the number of such patents. 26 Thus, publication and reexamination will not be sufficient in themselves to remove the need for more effective screening of patents and antitrust scrutiny.
II. Challenging Invalid Patents in Settlement Cases
The law generally favors settlements because they conserve public administrative and judicial resources, and also enable the parties to save time and expense, avoid the uncertainty of a litigated outcome, and employ their resources in other productive ventures. The same considerations apply to patent infringement cases, which can be extraordinarily complex, lengthy, and expensive. The alleged infringer risks entry of a permanent injunction restraining it from marketing its product (and recouping the costs already expended in its development) until the patent's expiration, and a judgment ordering payment of damages in the amount of the patentee's lost profits plus interest and costs. 27 The patentee in turn risks a finding of invalidity or noninfringement -a finding that is particularly costly to the patentee because it operates against the world. 28 All-comers, not just the defendant, may now practice the invention without compensation to the patentee.
Patent settlement agreements can also benefit consumers. Settlement agreements are often procompetitive. For example, when they enable market entry or provide for crosslicensing of complementary and blocking technologies, settlement agreements can lead to the adoption of more efficient production techniques. Consumers may benefit from the resulting availability of more output at lower prices.
Settlement, however, dramatically changes the incentives of the patentee and alleged infringer. Prior to settlement, the parties' interests are adverse, and that adversity promotes the public interest in policing patent validity. After settlement, the parties' interests are congruent:
Both seek to extend the patent to its broadest possible scope regardless of its enforceability.
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This alignment of incentives is particularly dangerous when the alleged infringer is one of only a few likely to challenge the patent. As Professors Hovenkamp, Janis, and Lemley ("HJL") note, a patent settlement agreement can effectuate a cartel or create or maintain a monopoly in an innovation or product market. 
Notification of Settlements
The secrecy of settlement agreements makes it difficult for antitrust enforcers to uncover possible violations and to know whether anti-competitive settlements are widespread. To be sure, as HJL explain, §135(c) of the Patent Act requires the filing of interference settlements and collateral agreements with the PTO. 31 The PTO, however, does not make a finding of validity when it accepts a §135 filing. It will send copies of filings to the FTC on request, allowing the FTC to assess whether the settlement implicates antitrust concerns. However, the FTC does not
receive notice of what filings have occurred, making it virtually impossible for it to request copies of filings that might be of interest, and antitrust authorities lack standing to enforce compliance with §135(c). 32 For these reasons, some believe that non-compliance with that section's requirements is widespread. 33 Furthermore, patent interference settlements represent only a subset of patent settlement
agreements. An interference proceeding is one between two applicants to determine priority.
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Many settlements arising from infringement litigation do not involve interference proceedings.
Currently, there is no requirement that parties file settlement agreements not involving interference proceedings with any enforcement agency. The Klein proposal to enable the antitrust authorities to effectively challenge patent settlement agreements also helps to alleviate the free rider or "public goods" problem associated with patent litigation. As noted above, a patent invalidity finding functions in favor of the world (including the defendant's competitors), not just the defendant who financed the litigation.
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These competitors do not have to compensate the successful defendant for this benefit. As
Attorney General Klein stated, allowing antitrust authorities to present arguments to a court overcomes the problem of defendants' limited resources and skewed enforcement incentives:
If [the antitrust agencies] had [a] right to be heard, we could ensure that meritorious defenses would not be abandoned, and questionable intellectual property claims would not triumph, without at least an opportunity for us to consider whether broader societal interests in competition warrant putting the claims to their proof, and to bring those considerations to the court's attention. Then, those broader interests would not be held hostage to the defendant's own economic interests, which may be subject to limited resources for litigation and a strong aversion to the consequences of defeat, no matter how remote the chances. . . .
[W]henever there is even a more than trivial possibility of infringement, the costs of litigation skew the parties' decisions, steering them away from a serious test of the bounds of the rights of the patentee . . ., and towards agreements that too often make teammates out of rivals. Since society picks up the tab for these agreements over the long run, I think it may be worth an investment of our resources up front to head them off where necessary. holding. Certainly, considerations of res judicata, finality, and preventing a settling party from engaging in successive hold-ups by re-opening validity challenges represent important public interests, but the public also benefits from removing invalid patents from the system. Therefore, the Flex-Foot rule should be read literally: The court there emphasized that the parties had an opportunity to conduct discovery. 56 Presumably, such discovery is likely to reveal much about probable patent invalidity. A limited rule permitting a settling party to reopen validity challenges when discovery has not occurred may be appropriate. Such a rule might be further limited by allowing re-opening of a settlement only when no other party is likely to challenge the patent. In such cases, the policies underlying res judicata and finality should yield to that of sheltering the public from unwarranted patents and monopolies.
III. Antitrust Analysis of Patent Settlements When Validity Uncertain
Antitrust analysis of patent settlement agreements presents no special difficulty when it is certain that the patent rights are either valid or invalid, as HJL clearly observe. valid patent rights and the validity of these rights is uncertain. 57 The issue has come to a head in recent pharmaceutical cases involving settlements between producers of established "pioneer" brands and generic substitutes.
In these cases antitrust legality has frequently focused on the issue of so-called "exit payments" or "reverse payments" under which the generic producer agrees to delay or even forgo competitive entry in return for a large payment from the pioneer. If the patent rights are valid, the settlement is likely to be lawful because, as HJL note, in that event the settlement is "[no] more anticompetitive than a likely outcome of the litigation." 58 Similarly, if the patents are invalid or not infringed, the settlement agreement will most likely be unlawful. But in fact, often the validity of the patent rights is unclear. The difficult question posed in the pharmaceutical cases is how the issue of antitrust legality is to be resolved when patent rights are uncertain.
At least three alternatives appear possible. First, the antitrust court (or agency) could attempt to assess patent validity directly. Second, the court could use objective indicators to determine validity. Third, the court could adopt an incentive-modifying legal rule that would motivate the patentee and alleged infringer to act in the public interest, and thereby remove the need for the antitrust court to determine patent validity. HJL propose a combination of the first and second alternatives.
Specifically, HJL propose a two-pronged test under which exit payments would be presumptively illegal unless the infringement plaintiff shows "both (a) that the ex ante likelihood of its infringement lawsuit is significant; and (b) that the size of the payment is no more than the expected value of litigation and collateral costs attending the lawsuit." 59 While we agree that an 57 Anticompetitive Settlement, supra note 2, at 16-17. The uncertainty may go either to patent validity or infringement. 58 Id. at 9. The settlement must also be a reasonable accommodation of the patent right. Id. 59 Id. at 43-44.
exit payment from the patent holder to an alleged infringer is a key indicator of questionable patent rights, we would exclude any requirement that patent validity be determined or estimated in an antitrust proceeding. Instead, in cases involving reverse payments we would rely primarily on the third alternative -private market forces operating under an incentives-modifying legal rule. Turning to the second prong of HJL's affirmative defense, we agree that the payment by the infringement plaintiff of no more than its expected litigation costs would be permissible.
However, we have doubts about inclusion of "collateral costs." Defendants in pharmaceutical cases have been quite inventive in enlarging collateral cost claims to include a range of costly uncertainties that they claim patent litigation introduces. 60 It is difficult to conceptualize a workable rule that will appropriately distinguish between "permissible" and "impermissible" collateral costs.
The paper now briefly comments on each of the three approaches.
Direct Assessment of Patent Validity
The most straightforward approach might appear to be for the court and the enforcement agencies to directly assess the validity of the patent rights. The proposal is not that the antitrust court should undertake a full patent adjudication, but that it should assess the probability that a patent court would hold the patent rights to be valid. HJL would simplify the inquiry by requiring only a determination whether the probability is "significant," but any approach that would require an antitrust court or agency to determine patent validity raises a number of questions.
Determining patent validity in an antitrust proceeding would greatly complicate antitrust litigation. The enforcement agencies lack expertise in patents. Their jurisdiction encompasses far too many industries for them to gain technical competence over the range of expected cases.
Moreover, the agencies must often act within strict time constraints, which challenge them even when the issues include only antitrust matters. The parties with the greatest knowledge of the facts -the patentee and the infringer -are biased against the government or private antitrust plaintiff since both now seek to uphold the patent. Further, the issue to be decided by the antitrust court is inherently ambiguous: what is a "significant" probability of validity? 15%?
35%? 51%? What effect would determination of significant probability by an antitrust court have on subsequent patent validity litigation? Indeed, antitrust judges may be reluctant to second-guess how a patent court might rule in a pending infringement case. Finally, the antitrust enforcement agencies have to our knowledge uniformly maintained that patent validity determination in an antitrust case is not feasible. attorney, and moves quite rapidly. 63 The ITC must approve any settlement as consistent with the public interest. 64 An informal survey revealed that in fiscal year 1998, twenty-six of twenty-nine §337 investigations concerned an allegation of patent infringement. 65 Of the fifteen investigations terminated by the ITC in 1998, eight were terminated by settlement or withdrawal of the complaint, three were held violations, and four were dismissed either because the patent was invalid or not infringed. 66 It would be difficult, however, to transfer the ITC system to domestic antitrust enforcement. The ITC heavily relies on the parties to the §337 proceeding to develop the evidence. 67 In the ITC proceeding, the parties are adversaries. In contrast, settling parties would be allies, placing the full burden of patent litigation on the FTC staff, a difficult challenge particularly in the absence of additional resources. 68 Moreover, the FTC probably could not adopt the ITC approach without statutory amendment giving it the power to sit as a patent court.
Objective Indictors of Patent Validity
As an alternative to adopting an ITC system for direct determination of patent validity in antitrust cases, antitrust regulators could attempt to identify proxies for patent validity -objective criteria or behavioral conditions that make economic sense only if the patent rights are invalid.
As discussed, exit payments are a key indicator and point to illegality if the payment exceeds litigation costs --although commentators differ on the strength of the inference to be drawn. In addition, courts and enforcement agencies might focus on behavioral indicators such as continued competition by the alleged infringer, continued purchasing by customers aware of the infringement claims, and willingness of the alleged infringer to indemnify its customers. 69 70 His work foreshadowed the reverse payment cases, observing, "It is inconsistent for a licensor to allege that it is maximizing the return from its invention by controlling price and output if it charges no royalty. The same conclusion follows from evidence of royalty rebates or from otherwise unaccountable cash payments from the licensor to the licensee." 71 He emphasized that antitrust enforcers should monitor the relationship between price and royalty as well as output and market share, drawing "unambiguous inferences" from how these metrics behave. 72 For example,
[W]here a patent license involving competing firms increases the price of a product without substantially altering the product itself, the license is illegitimate. . . .
. . .Where a patent is alleged to reduce manufacturing costs, the royalty should approximate the scale of the alleged cost reduction .
. . [W] here there is unexpected competition subsequent to the execution of the license, price cannot fall by more than the royalty unless the licenses are illegitimate. . . .
[E]vidence that licensees . . .havereduced or ceased production because of higher costs suggests that the licensees are not receiving cartel rents. . . .More generally, evidence over time of significant variation of market shares among licensees strongly suggests legitimacy.
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Since this approach does not require evaluation of patent validity, it provides a potentially useful tool to identify settlement agreements that are in fact disguised cartels.
Incentive Modifying Approach
The basic problem in the reverse payment cases involving the pharmaceutical industry is the skewing of competitive incentives between brand name and generic drug manufacturers, which causes them to become collaborators rather than rivals in vindicating their patent rights.
When these rights are invalid, the public interest suffers. Responding to this concern, the authors of this Comment have argued that settlement agreements in Hatch-Waxman cases should be limited to delayed entry by the generic producer (and of course may also provide for payment of royalties by the generic manufacturer). 74 This provides a clearly less restrictive alternative to a settlement involving a reverse payment. The authors have also advocated adoption of at least a rule of presumptive illegality as to such payments, with the burden on the parties to justify the payment, 75 and the allowable defenses should be limited to litigation costs.
With these measures in place, the government or private plaintiff then would not have to prove patent validity, and the clarity of the rule would likely induce more pro-competitive settlement agreements. The parties with the best information -the patentee and alleged infringer -would use their own estimates of validity to negotiate a settlement within bounds. A weak 73 Id. at 327-28. 74 
Conclusion
Identification and policing of anti-competitive settlement agreements challenges legal ingenuity. This Essay has suggested that viable strategies include taking cost-effective measures to decrease the number of invalid patents issued, implementing a notification requirement for patent settlement agreements, providing incentives to litigate validity, and permitting certain parties to re-open validity challenges after settlement. The Comment has also evaluated alternative ways for antitrust agencies and courts to confront the problem of assessing patent validity in settlement cases. We agree with HJL on the need for at least a rule of presumptive illegality against exit payments in settlements. However, we would rule out any justification for an exit payment (apartment from savings in attorney's fees) based on assessment of patent validity. Instead, we would rely on the less restrictive alternative of limiting the settlement terms to deferral of entry and the amount of the royalty to be paid by the licensee. 75 Id. 76 Id. at 56.
